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Violence, Representation, and Responsibility
in Capital Trials: The View from the Juryt
AUSTIN SARAT*
"Let's do it. "I
-Gary Gilmore
"Let's get on with it. '2
-William Rehnquist
INTRODUCTION
Writing about the continuing place of the death penalty in the apparatus of
criminal justice in the United States, Justice Stevens once noted the essential
role of the jury in both administering and legitimizing that punishment. "If the
State wishes to execute a citizen," Stevens wrote, "it must persuade a jury of
his peers that death is an appropriate punishment for his offense."3
If the prosecutor cannot convince a jury that the defendant deserves to die,
there is an unjustifiable risk that the imposition of that punishment will not
reflect the community's sense of the defendant's "moral guilt." . . . Furman
and its progeny provide no warrant for-indeed do not tolerate-the
exclusion from the capital sentencing process of the jury and the critical
contribution only it can make toward linking the administration of capital
punishment to community values.4
By highlighting the jury's place in the administration of capital punishment,
Stevens called attention to a fact which is widely taken for granted but is
nonetheless quite remarkable, namely that ordinary citizens are regularly
enlisted as authorizing agents for the law's own lethal brand of violence. As
Haney, Sontag, and Costanzo put it, "Capital trials are unique in American
jurisprudence and, indeed, in human experience. Under no other circumstance
does a group of ordinary citizens calmly and rationally contemplate taking the
life of another, all the while acting under color of law."5 This kind of
t © Copyright 1995 by Austin Sarat. All rights reserved.
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science, Amherst College,
Department of Political Science; Department of Law, Jurisprudence and Social Thought. J.D., Yale Law
School, 1988; M.A. & Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1973; B.A., Providence College, 1969.
This Article was presented at the National Conference on Juries and the Death Penalty at the Indiana
University School of Law-Bloomington (Feb. 24, 1995). An earlier version of this Article was presented
at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the Law & Society Association and to the Amherst Seminar. I am
grateful to participants in those events for their helpful comments and to Sally Merry for her extended
and insightful critique.
I. Bill Beecham, Let's Do It, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1987, § 1, at 2, 12 (quoting Gary Gilmore
immediately prior to his execution).
2. Katherine Bishop, After Night of Court Battles, a California Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
1992, at Al, A22 (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist's plea to end delays in carrying out capital
punishment).
3. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 490 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
4. Id. at 489-90.
5. Craig Haney et al., Deciding to Take a Life: Capital Juries, Sentencing Instructions, and the
Jurisprudence of Death, J. Soc. IssuEs, Summer 1994, at 149, 149.
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democratically administered death penalty is a reminder of a venerable yet
enduring problem in social life, namely the question of how people come to
participate in projects of violence, of how cultural inhibitions against the
infliction of pain can be turned into cultural support for such projects by
otherwise decent persons.6 In this Article, I investigate how jurors interpret
the discourse and representational practices surrounding capital trials, thus
lending themselves to the use of lethal violence.
In spite of the enthusiasm of persons as seemingly different as Gary
Gilmore and William Rehnquist, and the substantial public support which the
death penalty continues to garner,7 it is nonetheless unsettling that the United
States clings tenaciously to such a policy long after almost all other
democratic nations have abandoned it.' It is unsettling because the conscious,
deliberate taking of life as an instrument of state policy is always an evil, but
never more so than in a democracy. 9 "The death penalty," as Terry Aladjem
writes, "strains an unspoken premise of the democratic state"' 0 that may
variously be named respect for the equal moral worth or equal dignity of all
persons. Democratically administered capital punishment, punishment in
which citizens act in an official capacity to approve the deliberate killing of
other citizens, contradicts and diminishes the respect for the worth or dignity
of all persons that is the enlivening value of democratic politics. 2 In
addition, a death penalty that is democratically administered, a death penalty
that enlists citizens to do the work of dealing death to other citizens,
implicates us all as agents of law's violence.'
3
6. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL (1963); STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974).
7. For an analysis of the nature and depth of public support for the death penalty, see William
Bowers, Capital Punishment and Contemporary Values: People's Misgivings and the Court's
Misperceptions, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 157, 162 (1993); see also Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R.
Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans' Views on the Death Penalty, 50 J. Soc. ISSUES, Summer
1994, at 19, 19.
8. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN
AGENDA 3-4 (1986).
9. Robert Burt has recently suggested that
[t]he retaliatory force justified by the criminal law ... has the same place in democratic
theory as majority rule. Each is a form of coercion and neither is legitimate as such. Criminal
law penalties and majority rule are both rough expedients, tolerably consistent with the
democratic equality principle only if all disputants (but most particularly, the dominant party)
see their application of defensive coercion as a limited way station working ultimately toward
the goal of a consensual relationship among acknowledged equals.
Robert A. Burt, Democracy, Equality, and the Death Penalty, in THE RULE OF LAW: NOMOS XXXVI
80, 89 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).
10. Terry Aladjem, Revenge and Consent: The Death Penalty and Lockean Principals of Democracy
2 (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
11. See A.I. Melden, Dignity, Worth, and Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS 29 (Michael
J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992); Jordan I. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right:
A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 HOw. L.J. 145, 150 (1984).
12. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Hugo A. Bedau,
The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death Penalty, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS,
supra note 11, at 145.
13. An execution, Wendy Lesser argues, is "a killing carried out in all our names, an act of the state
in which we by proxy participate, [and] it is also the only form of murder that directly implicates even
the witnesses, the bystanders." WENDY LESSER, PICTURES AT AN EXECUTION 4 (1993).
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Along with the right to make war, 4 the death penalty is the ultimate
measure of sovereignty and the ultimate test of political power. "Political
power," John Locke wrote, ". . .[is] a right of making laws with penalties of
death . . . . , Others note that "the state's power deliberately to destroy
innocuous (though guilty) life is a manifestation of the hidden wish that the
state be allowed to do anything it pleases with life.'
' 6
The right to dispose of human life through sovereign acts was traditionally
thought to be a direct extension of the personal power of kings. 7 With the
transition from monarchical to democratic regimes, some theorists argued that
the maintenance of capital punishment was essential to the demonstration that
sovereignty could reside in the people. For such theorists, if the sovereignty
of the people was to be genuine, it had to mimic the sovereign power and
prerogatives of monarchy. Rather than seeing the true task of democracy as
the transformation of sovereignty and its prerogatives in the hope of
reconciling them with a commitment to respecting the dignity of all persons,
the death penalty was miraculously transformed from an instrument of
political terror used by "them" against "us," to "our" instrument wielded
consensually by some of us against others.'8 Thus, punishment became a key
to understanding modem mechanisms of consent. 9
And if the death penalty is, on this account, the ultimate measure of popular
sovereignty, capital trials are the moment when that sovereignty is most
vividly on display.2" Indeed, capital trials have displaced execution itself as
the venue for the display of sovereignty, since "[p]unishment ... [by means
of the death penalty has] become the most hidden part of the penal pro-
cess." 21 As Foucault argues:
This has several consequences: [punishmentj leaves the domain of more or
less everyday perception and enters that of abstract consciousness; its
effectiveness is seen as resulting from its inevitability, not from its visible
intensity; it is the certainty of being punished and not the horrifying
spectacle of public punishment that must discourage crime .... As a
result, justice no longer takes public responsibility for the violence that is
bound up with its practice.22
14. See Elaine Scarry, The Declaration of War: Constitutional and Unconstitutional Violence, in
LAw's VIOLENCE (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992).
15. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 4 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-
Merrill Co. 1952) (1690).
16. GEORGE KATEB, THE INNER OCEAN: INDIVIDUALISM AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 192 (William
Connolly ed., 1992).
17. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 47-48 (Alan Sheridan
trans., 1977).
18. See LOCKE, supra note 15, at 8.
19. Aladjem, supra note 10, at 2; see also THOMAS L. DUMM, DEMOCRACY AND PUNISHMENT:
DISCIPLINARY ORIGINS OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (1987) (suggesting that the American system of self-
rule paved the way for individuals to realize and internalize liberal and democratic values).
20. See Haney et al., supra note 5, at 149 ("Under no other circumstance does a group of ordinary
citizens calmly and rationally contemplate taking the life of another, all the while acting under color of
law."). On the significance of capital trials in general, see Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: Narratives
of Violence in Capital Trials, 27 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 19, 20 (1993).
21. FOUCAULT, supra note 17, at 9.
22. Id.
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But "justice" (meaning "law") cannot completely or fully sever its responsi-
bility for violence.
One particularly striking recent example, the much-publicized execution of
Robert Alton Harris, is a telling reminder of the continuing linkage of law and
violence. During the twelve-hour period immediately preceding Harris'
execution, no less than four separate stays were issued by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.23 Ultimately, in an exasperated and unusually dramatic
expression of Chief Justice Rehnquist's aphoristic response to the seemingly
endless appeals in capital cases-"Let's get on with it"2 4-the Supreme
Court took the virtually unprecedented (and seemingly illegal) step of ordering
that "[n]o further stays .. . shall be entered . . . except upon order of this
Court. ' ' 25 With this order, the Court put a stop to the talk and took upon
itself the responsibility for Harris' execution.
In contrast with Foucault's premise, seldom has the law's own role as a
doer of death been so visible. Yet, just as the law's role was rendered
unusually visible, Harris' death was, as Foucault would have it, rendered
invisible. His execution was carried out, as is the modem custom, behind
penitentiary walls, beyond public view.2 6 In this way the penalty of death is
linked to the privilege of viewing.27
23. Bishop, supra note 2, at Al. A tangled maze of last minute legal maneuvers preceded Harris'
death in California's gas chamber. Harris was the 169th person to be executed in the United States since
the Supreme Court restored capital punishment in 1976. As with many previous executions, the hope
for clemency or the possibility of a stay of execution was pursued until the last minute. Id.; see also
Evan Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of Robert Alton Harris, 102 YALE L.J.
225 (1992) (describing the events leading up to Harris' execution and critiquing the Ninth Circuit and
Supreme Court responses to the case); Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, the Death Penalty, and
the Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205 (1992) (critiquing the manner in which the American legal system
functioned in the case).
24. Bishop, supra note 2, at A22.
25. Vasquez v. Harris, 112 S. Ct. 1713, 1714 (1992). The Court scolded Harris' lawyers for
"abusive delay which has been compounded by last minute attempts to manipulate the judicial process."
Bishop, supra note 2, at A22. In so doing, the Court portrayed law as the victim of Harris and his
manipulative lawyers, thus displacing Harris from his position as the soon-to-be victim of law.
Defending the virtue of law required an assertion of the Court's supremacy against both the vexatious
sympathies of other courts and the efforts of Harris and his lawyers to keep alive a dialogue about death.
For a discussion of the role of lawyers in the death penalty process, see generally Austin Sarat, Between
(The Presence of) Violence and (The Possibility of) Justice: Lawyering Against Capital Punishment (Jan.
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
26. "In a last macabre twist, the A.C.L.U., which opposes capital punishment in all cases, received
last-minute permission ... to videotape [Harris'] execution." Bishop, supra note 2, at A22. See
generally Jeff I. Richards & R. Bruce Easter, Televising Executions: The High-Tech Alternative to Public
Hangings, 40 UCLA L. REv. 381 (1992) (noting the lack of television coverage of Harris' execution
and presenting a constitutional rationale for allowing such coverage).
27. While executions must be witnessed to be lawful, witnessing is carefully monitored. Who will
be allowed to see what is for most of us unseeable is an important question in every execution. See
ROBERT JoHNsoN, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS 102-04 (1990).
Thus, capital punishment is a hidden reality; what we know about the way law carries out the death
penalty comes in the most highly mediated way as a rumor, a report, an account of the voiceless
expression of the body of the condemned. "According to several witnesses, Mr. Harris appeared to lose
consciousness after about one and one-half minutes, although his body continued a series of convulsions
and his head jerked backward several times." Bishop, supra note 2, at A22.
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Silencing the condemned and limiting the visibility of lawfully imposed
death is part of the modem bureaucratization of capital punishment,2 8 and
part of the strategy for transforming execution from an arousing public
spectacle of vengeance to a soothing matter of mere administration.29 In
Foucault's words, it was "as if this rite that 'concluded the crime' was
suspected of being in some undesirable way linked with it. It was as if the
punishment was thought to equal, if not to exceed, in savagery the crime itself
S.. to make the executioner resemble a criminal, [and] judges murderers
*. -"30 The ferocity of death at the hands of the law as well as its premedi-
tated quality arouse anxiety and fear; they suggest that law's violence bears
substantial traces of the violence it is designed to deter and punish.3' The
bloodletting signaled by executions strains against, and ultimately disrupts, all
efforts to normalize or routinize them and cloak them in secrecy.
While execution itself is effectively hidden from public view, the spectacle
of law's dealings in death is (re)located and made visible in capital trials.32
The formality, complexity, and ritual of capital trials displace, at least
symbolically and analogically, execution itself as the site of law's violent
majesty. Such trials provide one striking example of what Robert Cover called
the "field of pain and death" 33 in which law acts. While their formality,
complexity, and ritual seek to allay the fear of law's violence by exemplifying
the way in which law differs from mere slaughter, in capital trials the
violence of law is inscribed in struggles to put violence into discourse and to
control its discursive representation.34 In capital trials, the focus is on the
case rather than the body of the "condemned. 35
28. The association of law and violence, though rendered invisible in the bureaucratization of capital
punishment, is sometimes made visible elsewhere, for example, in the use of lethal force by police.
Moreover, as Jacques Derrida observes, this relationship is present in the ease and comfort with which
Americans speak about enforcing the law:
"[E]nforceability," is not an exterior or secondary possibility that may or may not be added as
a supplement to law.... The word "enforceability" reminds us that there is no such thing as
law (droit) that doesn't imply in itself, apriori,. . . the possibility of being "enforced," applied
by force. There are, to be sure, laws that are not enforced, but there is no law without
enforceability, and no applicability or enforceability of the law without force, whether this
force be direct or indirect, physical or symbolic ....
Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority", 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 921,
925-27 (1990) (emphasis in original).
29. See FOUCAULT, supra note 17, at 7-17.
30. Id. at9.
31. Cf. Thomas L. Dumm, Fear of Law, in 10 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS AND Socimn' 29,44-49
(Susan S. Silbey & Austin Sarat eds., 1990). As Dumm puts it,
In the face of the law that makes people persons, people need to fear. Yet people also need law
to protect them .... Hence fear is a political value that is valuable because it is critical of
value, a way of establishing difference that enables uncertainty in the face of danger.
Id. at 54.
32. Sarat, supra note 20, at 51-55.
33. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
34. Sarat, supra note 20, at 51-55.
35. Foucault suggests that "publicity has shifted to the trial, and to the sentence; the execution itself
is like an additional shame that justice is ashamed to impose on the condemned man." FOUCAULT, supra
note 17, at 9.
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As a result, the Supreme Court has invested enormous effort in regulating
the conduct of capital trials, insisting almost two decades ago that because
"death is different,"36 capital trials must be conducted according to proce-
dures designed to insure their special reliability. 7 In these procedures, the
jury plays a special role.31 It provides the mechanism through which the
death penalty is made an instrument of popular sovereignty,3 9 and through
which citizens are enlisted to authorize the ferocious, life-ending violence of
law. The jury performs the complex deed of differentiating the violence of
law from the violence to which law is opposed." The jury's decision to
impose a death sentence expresses public condemnation for the violence that
exists just beyond law's boundary while simultaneously muting the violence
of law, shading and toning it down, and rendering it acceptable, thus making
the act of the executioner a kind of violence which can be approved and
rationally dispensed.41 In capital trials, these two gestures co-exist, but their
co-existence is always an uneasy one.
I. CAPITAL TRIALS AND LAW'S VIOLENCE
The uneasy linkage between law and violence is widely recognized, yet the
ways in which law manages to "work its lethal will, to impose pain and death
while remaining aloof and unstained by the deeds themselves, is still an
unexplored and hardly noticed mystery in the life of the law."42 As pervasive
as the relationship of law and violence is, it is, nonetheless, difficult to speak
about that relationship, or to know precisely what one is talking about when
one speaks about law's violence.43 This difficulty arises because law is
36. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.) ("[D]eath is a punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree.");
see also Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Super Due Process for Death, in PUNISHMENT AND
REHABILITATION (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 1985).
37. Recent Supreme Court decisions have retreated significantly from this effort. See, e.g., Walton
v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990).
38. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that the basic question of whether the death
penalty is excessive in any particular crime must be answered by the decision-maker who is best able
to "express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death." 391 U.S. 510,
519 (1968). But see Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 449 (1984) (holding that "there is no
constitutional requirement that the jury's recommendation... be final").
39. As Tocqueville put it, "The institution of the jury... invests the people.., with the direction
of society." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 361 (Henry Reeve trans., 6th ed.
1876) (1835).
40. Some philosophers, of course, suggest that there is no difference between capital punishment
and murder. See Albert Camus, Reflexions sur la Guillotine [Reflections on the Guillotine], in
RtFLEXIONS SUR LA PEINE CAPITALE 123, 126 (1957).
41. "[T]he decision of whether or not someone should live or die is... a normative question for
which there are not necessarily widely shared nor even easily accessible norms. Here is where the jury's
role as the conscience of the community is raised (or lowered) to its most basic level." Haney et al.,
supra note 5, at 155 (emphasis in original).
42. Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, A Journey Through Forgetting: Toward a Jurisprudence of
Violence, in THE FATE oF LAW 209, 211 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams eds., 1991).
43. As Ronald Dworkin argues,
Day in and day out we send people to jail, or take money away from them, or make them do
things they.do not want to do, under coercion of force, and we justify all this by speaking of
such persons as having broken the law or having failed to meet their legal obligations ....
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violent in many ways-in the ways it uses language and in its representational
practices,44 in its silencing of perspectives and its denial of experience,45
and in its objectifying epistemology. 6 It arises from the fact that the
linguistic, representational violence of the law (as seen in capital trials) is
inseparable from its literal, physical violence (capital punishment). As Peter
Fitzpatrick suggests:
In its narrow perhaps popular sense, violence is equated with unrestrained
physical violence . . . . A standard history of the West would connect a
decline in violence with an increase in civility. Others would see civility
itself as a transformed violence, as a constraining even if not immediately
coercive discipline .... The dissipation of simple meaning is heightened
in recent sensibilities where violence is discerned in the denial of the
uniqueness or even existence of "the other" . . . . These expansions of the
idea of violence import a transcendent ordering-an organizing, shaping
force coming to bear on situations from outside of them and remaining
essentially unaffected by them.47
Violence, as both a linguistic and physical phenomenon, as fact and
metaphor,48 is integral to the constitution of modem law.49 Modem law is
Even in clear cases... when we are confident that someone had a legal obligation and broke
it, we are not able to give a satisfactory account of what that means, or why that entitles the
state to punish or coerce him. We may feel confident that what we are doing is proper, but
until we can identify the principles we are following we cannot be sure that they are sufficient
.... In less clear cases... the pitch of these nagging questions rises, and our responsibility
to find answers deepens.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 15 (1977).
Another version of this difficulty is described by Samuel Weber. According to Weber,
To render impure, literally: to "touch with" (something foreign, alien), is also to violate. And
to violate something, is to do violence to it. Inversely, it is difficult to conceive of violence
without violation, so much so that the latter might well be a criterion of the former no
violence without violation, hence, no violence without a certain contamination.
Samuel Weber, Deconstruction Before the Name: Some [Very] Preliminary Remarks on Deconstruction
and Violence 2 (Sept. 26, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Indiana Law Journal)
(emphasis in original).
44. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987). For an interesting
treatment of representation as violence in a non-legal context, see THE VIOLENCE OF REPRESENTATION:
LITERATURE AND THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE (Nancy Armstrong & Leonard Tennenhouse eds., 1989)
[hereinafter THE VIOLENCE OF REPRESENTATION].
45. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990); Teresa de Lauretis, The Violence
of Rhetoric: Considerations on Representation and Gender, in THE VIOLENCE OF REPRESENTATION,
supra note 44, at 239; Joan W. Scott, The Evidence of Experience, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 773 (1991).
46. Robin West, Disciplines, Subjectivity, and Law, in THE FATE OF LAW, supra note 42, at 119.
47. Peter Fitzpatrick, Violence and Legal Subjection 1 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Indiana Law Journal); see also Robert P. Wolff, Violence and the Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 54
(Robert P. Wolff ed., 1971).
48. Drucilla Comell suggests that the violent "foundation" of law is allegorical rather than
metaphorical:
[T]he Law of Law is only "present" in its absolute absence. The "never has been" of an
unrecoverable past is understood as the lack of origin "presentable" only as allegory. The Law
of Law, in other words, is the figure of an initial fragmentation, the loss of the Good. But this
allegory is inescapable because the lack of origin is the fundamental truth.
Drucilla Comell, From the Lighthouse: The Promise of Redemption and the Possibility of Legal
Interpretation, II CARDOZO L. REV. 1687, 1689 (1990).
49. See WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS: ESSAYS, APHORISMS,
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITING 277 (Peter Demetz ed. & Edmund Jepchott trans., Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich 1978) (1955); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Crawford B. MacPherson ed., 1985) (1651);
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a creature of both a literal, life-threatening, body-crushing violence, and of
imaginings and threats of force, disorder, and pain. In the absence of such
imaginings and threats, there would be no law. Law is thus built on
representations of aggression, force, and disruption. It is, in this sense,
dependent on the capacity of language to both represent violence and to
contain violence by linguistic acts.
But law is built on more than metaphors, and the capital trial is a vivid
reminder of that fact. Were it possible to respond adequately to violence with
metaphors alone, law would be superfluous. Thus, were there to be no
occasion or need for violence, there would be no occasion or need for law.5'
Law's relationship to violence exists in the tangle of the literal and
metaphorical; nowhere is this more vividly demonstrated than in capital
trials. 2 Yet law constantly appears and presents itself as a means of
disentangling the literal from the metaphorical, of legislating in words,
symbols, and metaphors, what counts as the real and what really counts.53
Law seeks to be, or to define, the boundary between life and death, guilty
killing and innocent execution, the real and the fictive, the possible and the
unimaginable. Moreover, the continued existence of law and of capital trials
stands as a monument to a precarious hope that words can contain and control
violence, that unspeakable pain can be made to speak, and that aggression and
desire can be tamed and be put to useful public purposes. If law is to succeed
it must always conquer (or appear to conquer) force, and calm (or appear to
calm) turmoil.5 4
At the same time, legal violence must be domesticated. This domestication
requires a reconciliation between violence and reason.55 That reconciliation
is always difficult, always precarious. Thus, the violence that is regularly
spoken about in capital trials stands as the limit of law, and as a reminder of
both law's continuing necessity and its ever-present failing. Without violence,
law is unnecessary; yet in the presence of violence, law, like language and
representation themselves, may be impossible.56
Capital trials remind one that law's violent constitution does not end with
the establishment of legal order. The law, constituted in part in response to
HANS KELsEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg trans., 1961); Noberto Bobbio,
Law and Force, 49 MONIST 321 (1965); Fitzpatrick, supra note 47, at 2.
50. Sarat & Kearns, supra note 42, at 222.
51. "If a law cannot exist apart from the exercise of force, then laws must desire transgressions.
Since law is the resistance of transgression, law needs and yet cannot bear transgression. Transgressions,
in turn, are not really lawless but are other laws that themselves desire transgressions." Mark C. Taylor,
Desire ofLaw-Law ofDesire, I I CARDOZO L. REV. 1269, 1272 (1990) (emphases in original); see also
Jan Narveson, Force, Violence, and Law, in JUSTICE, LAW, AND VIOLENCE 150 (James B. Brady &
Newton Garver eds., 1991).
52. Lesser contends that all trials have a "fiction-like quality" that can "in part be attributed to the
theatrical nature of the legal process itself." LESSER, supra note 13, at 125.
53. See Derrida, supra note 28.
54. See Carl Wellman, Violence, Law, and Basic Rights, in JUSTICE, LAW, AND VIOLENCE, supra
note 51, at 170, 176-86.
55. On the general problem of violence and reason, see Sarat & Kearns, supra note 42, at 265-73.
56. See ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD (1985).
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metaphorical violence, is a doer of literal violence; law as the peaceful
alternative to the chaos and fury of a fictive state of nature inscribes itself on
bodies."7 As Cover so vividly put it, law "deal[s] pain and death," ' s and
calls the pain and death which it deals "peace."59 Once established, law
maintains itself, at least in part, through force and as an apparatus of violence
which disorders, disrupts, and repositions preexisting relations and practices
all in the name of an allegedly superior order." That order demonstrates its
"superiority" in ferocious displays of force, and in subjugating, colonizing,
and "civilizing" acts of violence." Violence thus constitutes law in three
57. See FOUCAULT, supra note 17, at 3-32; see also FRANZ KAFKA, In the Penal Colony, in THE
PENAL COLONY: STORIES AND SHORT PIECES 191 (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., 1948). As Virginia Held
puts it, "The legal rules of almost any legal system permit the use of violence to preserve and enforce
the laws, whether these laws are just or not, but forbid most other uses of violence." Virginia Held,
Violence, Terrorism, and Moral Inquiry, in ETHICAL THEORY AND SOCIAL ISSUES: HISTORICAL TEXTS
AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 474 (David T. Goldberg ed., 1988).
58. Cover, supra note 33, at 1609. Cover insisted, even at the price of doing linguistic violence,
that "the violence... [of law] is utterly real-in need of no interpretation, no critic to reveal it-a naive
but immediate reality. Take a short trip to your local prison and see." Robert M. Cover, The Bonds of
Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the Role, 20 GA. L. REv. 815, 818 (1986).
The coercive character of law is central to law, systematic, and quite unlike the "psychoanalytic violence
of literature or the metaphorical characterizations of literary critics and philosophers." Id. at 818-19.
Cover thus invited us to imagine and construct a jurisprudence of violence, and to theorize about law
by attending to its pain-imposing, death-dealing acts.
Cover was both a critic of, and an apologist for, law's violence. In his critical mode, he saw the fury
of state law as a barrier to the achievement of a normatively rich, legally plural community, and he
urged judges to go far in tolerating and respecting the normative claims of communities whose visions
of the good did not comport with the commands and requirements of state law. He argued that unless
judges could articulate normative arguments more compelling than those presented by such communities,
a just legal order would respect and accommodate the latter rather than violently impose itself. It is
never enough, in Cover's view, for a judge to retreat to the positivist assertion that deference and
obedience is required merely because state law commands it. NARRATIVE VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE
ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 151-55 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992).
Yet Cover recoguized the need for law's occasional violent impositions, and he attended carefully
to the prerequisites for law's successful use of violence. For law to achieve such success, its social
organization would have to find resources to both overcome and regulate cultural and moral inhibitions
against the use of physical force. To overcome those inhibitions, Cover suggested that strong
justifications would have to be provided, and that such justifications, when combined with a well-
articulated structure of roles and offices, might then assure relatively automatic compliance with the
violence authorizing (or restraining) orders of judges. Thus, for law's violent impositions to work in the
world-for words to be translated into violent deeds-strong justifications would have to be provided.
Here, Cover was more apologist than critic. Cover, supra note 33, at 1615.
There is, in essence, a two-fold message in Cover's work: "Wherever possible, withhold violence;
let new worlds flourish. But, for the sake of life, do not forget that law's violence is sometimes
necessary and that its availability is not automatic but must be provided for.... To do its job, then, law
must be violent, but as little as possible." Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Making Peace with
Violence: Robert Cover on Law and Legal Theory, in LAW's VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 211, 241
(emphasis in original).
59. Sarat & Keams, supra note 58, at 232.
60. See BENJAMIN, supra note 49, at 287; see also KARL OLIVECRONA, LAW As FACT 86-114
(1939); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language and Family
Violence 13 (Mar. 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Indiana Law Journal). As Minow
puts it, "Law is itself violent in its forms and methods. Official power effectuates itself in physical
force." Id.
61. Edgar Friedenberg contends:
The police often slay; but they are seldom socially defined as murderers. Students who block
the entrances to buildings or occupy a vacant lot and attempt to build a park in it are defined
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senses: (1) it provides the occasion and method for founding legal orders;62
(2) it gives law (as the regulator of force and coercion) a reason for being; n3
and (3) it provides a means through which law acts."
Yet, law denies the violence of its origins65 by proclaiming the force it
deploys to be "legitimate. ' 66 As Robert Paul Wolff argues, violence is, in the
eyes of the law, "the illegitimate or unauthorized use of force to effect
decisions against the will or desire of others. Thus, murder is an act of
violence, but capital punishment by a legitimate state is not. '67 The capital
trial is one particularly important event through which law seeks to distinguish
the killings which it opposes from the force which expresses its opposition.
In such trials, illegal violence is juxtaposed to the "legitimate" force that the
state seeks to apply to its killer.
In and through its claims to legitimacy, what law does is privileged and
distinguished from, "the violence that one always deems unjust."6 Legitimacy
is thus one way of charting the boundaries of law's violence. It is also the
minimal answer to skeptical questions about the ways in which law's violence
differ's from the turmoil and disorder that the law is allegedly brought into
being to conquer.69 But the need to legitimate law's violence is nagging and
continuing, never fully resolved in any single gesture.70 That need is satisfied
as not merely being disorderly but violent; the law enforcement officials who gas and club
them into submission are perceived as restorers of order, as, indeed, they are of the status quo
ante which was orderly by definition.
Edgar Z. Friedenberg, The Side Effects of the Legal Process, in THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 47, at
37, 43 (italics in original). As Fitzpatrick puts it, "[T]his association of law with order, security and
regularity rapidly became general and obvious, the violence associated with the establishment of law
and order assuming insignificance in the immeasurability of the violence and disorder of savagery."
Fitzpatrick, supra note 47, at 15; see also TZVETAN TODOROv, THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA: THE
QUESTION OF THE OTHER (Richard Howard trans., 1984).
62. Derrida, supra note 28, at 981.
63. HOBBES, supra note 49, at 185; see also Fitzpitrick, supra note 47, at 2.
64. Cover, supra note 33, at 1601.
65. Derrida, supra note 28, at 981.
66. See Wolff, supra note 47, at 55-62; see also Bernhard Waldenfels, Limits of Legitimation and
the Question of Violence, in JUSTICE, LAW, AND VIOLENCE, supra note 51, at 99, 99. For a classic
discussion of legitimacy, see MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max
Rheinstein ed., 1954). An important study of the production of legal legitimacy is provided by Douglas
Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1975).
67. Wolff, supra note 47, at 59 (emphases in original).
68. Derrida, supra note 28, at 927; see also Friedenberg, supra note 61, at 43. Friedenberg argues:
If by violence one means injurious attacks on persons or destruction of valuable inanimate
objects... then nearly all the violence done in the world is done by legitimate authority, or
at least by the agents of legitimate authority engaged in official business .... Yet their actions
are not deemed to be violence ....
Id.
69. See Wolff, supra note 47, at 59.
70. For a powerful example of different efforts to legitimate law's violence, compare the opinions
of Justices Scalia and Blackmun in Callins v. Collins. 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1127 (1994) (mem.) (Scalia, J.,
concurring), denying cert. to 998 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1993); id. at 1128 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see
also Robert Weisberg, Private Violence as Moral Action: The Law as Inspiration and Example, in
LAW'S VIOLENCE, supra note 14, at 175, 175 (arguing that "the violence perpetrated by private
individuals against each other[] represents an act of law-making or law enforcement for the perpetrator,
and how it often serves as the operative law in his or her culture").
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(to the extent it can be satisfied at all) in the representational practices and
discursive modes which are deployed to speak about violence inside and
outside law, and in the decisions ofjuries which, as Justice Stevens suggested,
distinguish capital punishment from murder in the situated moments-capital
trials-when both are spoken about at once.7'
In such events, one witnesses the discursive constitution of law's violence
as rational, controlled, and purposive, and the juxtaposition of the alleged
rationality of legal coercion with the irrationality of a violence that knows no
law.72 One encounters claims that law's violence is controlled through
values, norms, procedures, and purposes external to violence itself. In capital
trials, the force of law is represented as serving common purposes and
advancing common aims as against the anomic or sectarian savagery beyond
law's boundaries.73 Capital trials are thus both the "field" of pain and death
on which law plays and the "field" of its discursive representation. And as
Robert Weisberg argues, such trials provide "a representational medium that
... serves as a grammar of social symbols.... The criminal trial is a
'miracle play' of government in which we can carry out our inarticulate
beliefs about crime and criminals within the reassuring formal structure of
disinterested due process."'74
II. THE CENTRALITY OF THE JURY IN THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF DEATH
In the context of contemporary death penalty jurisprudence, the jury is the
literal manifestation of Weisberg's "we." It is the jury which represents the
fullest actualization of popular sovereignty-the right of the people to
Walter Benjamin argues that
in the exercise of violence over life and death more than in any other legal act, law reaffirms
itself. But in this very violence something rotten in law is revealed, above all to a finer
sensibility, because the latter knows itself to be infinitely remote from conditions in which fate
might imperiously have shown itself in such a sentence.
BENJAMIN, supra note 49, at 286; see also Camus, supra note 40.
The imperatives of violence may be so overwhelming as to distort and destroy prevailing normative
commitments. Two powerful examples are provided by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Payne v. Tennessee,
and by Justice Powell in McCleskey v. Kemp. Payne, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (devising a new
understanding of the binding nature of precedent to overturn two decisions forbidding the use of victim
impact information in death penalty litigation); McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that statistical
evidence of racial discrimination may not be used to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in
death penalty cases).
Unfortunately, except in the utopian imagination, there is no symmetry in the relation of law and
violence. Law never similarly threatens violence. Even when we realize the way law itself often
exaggerates the threat of violence outside law, we can never ourselves imagine that law could ever
finally conquer and undo force, coercion, and disorder, its best promise is a promise to substitute one
kind of force-legitimate force-for another.
71. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
72. See Sarat, supra note 20, at 54.
73. See SUSAN JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE: THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE 291-93 (1983); see also
Jonathan Rieder, The Social Organization of Vengeance, in TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL
CONTROL 131 (Donald Black ed., 1984) (discussing vengeance as a form of social control in simple
societies).
74. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305, 385.
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exercise power over life and death." Judge Patrick Higginbotham believes
that the histories of the death penalty and the jury are entangled. This, he
says,
should not be a surprise. The choice between a sentence of life or death is
uniquely laden with expressions of anger and retribution .... By its nature,
it is a decision that we instinctively believe is best made by a group of
citizens, because a group better represents community values and because
responsibility for such a decision is best shared. Equally, the ultimate call
is visceral. The decision must occur past the point to which legalistic
reasoning can carry; it necessarily reflects a gut-level hunch as to what is
just. 6
The jury, in Higginbotham's view, represents the vengeful anger of the
democratic community,77 which is the truest expression of community
values.7 The jury's justice is a kind of violent transgression of both reason
and law. Because of the gravity and uniqueness of the decision to sentence
someone to death, the juror voting whether to authorize a killing by the state,
Higginbotham argues, knows no law.79 As Justice Stevens has observed,
"[I]n the final analysis, capital punishment rests on not a legal but an ethical
judgment .... And... the decision that capital punishment is the appro-
priate sanction in extreme cases is justified because it expresses the
community's moral sensibility-its demand that a given affront to humanity
requires retribution. 0
Because the juror gives voice to the community's instincts, he helps to
diffuse responsibility for the punishment of death when it is authorized. Here,
then, is an important reformulation of the problem of popular sovereignty and
the death penalty. On the one hand, the juror speaks in the powerful, angry,
retributive tones of a sovereign assaulted; on the other hand, the juror speaks
75. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). According to Justice Stevens, "[T]he jury is
central to the link between capital punishment and the standards of decency contained in the Eighth
Amendment ...." Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 483 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
76. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1047, 1048-
49 (1991). Similarly, Justice Stevens argues: "The authors of our federal and state constitutional
guarantees uniformly recognized the special function of the jury in any exercise of plenary power over
the life and liberty of the citizen." Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 481; see also Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who
Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1980) (discussing procedures for determining who makes death penalty
sentencing decisions).
77. As Justice Blackmun, writing for the Spaziano majority, stated, "The imposition of the death
penalty... is an expression of community outrage." Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 461.
78. This view of the jury as a representative body, imagines sovereignty to lie in the community.
As the Supreme Court suggests, "[A] jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital
punishment can do little more-and must do nothing less-than express the conscience of the
community on the ultimate question of life or death." Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519.
79. Higginbotham, supra note 76, at 1051. As Justice Stewart noted, "American jurors have, with
some regularity, disregarded their oaths and refused to convict defendants where a death sentence was
the automatic consequence of a guilty verdict." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976).
80. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In his opinion,
Justice Stevens argued that because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, "it is the one punishment
that cannot be prescribed by a rule of law as judges normally understand such rules." Id. at 468-69.
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in the muted, timid tones of someone whose sovereignty exists as an act of
displaced blame.
Beginning with McGautha v. California,8' the Supreme Court has struggled
to come to terms with this contradictory image of the jury in capital cases.
During the last two decades, the Court has alternatively expressed expansive
faith in (and support for) the jury as a reliable, trustworthy repository of the
sovereign right over the lives of citizens, and doubt (and concern) about the
jury's capacity to exercise that power responsibly. 8 Throughout, the Court
has struggled to define the jury's role as the crucial decision-maker in the
capital punishment process.83
McGautha provided the framework for the constitutional struggle which was
to follow. In that case, the defendant alleged that a California statute that left
the "decision whether the defendant should live or die ... to the absolute
discretion of the jury" violated due process of law.84 This claim evoked two
very different responses: one, from Justice Harlan, embraced the California
scheme and with it, expansive power for the jury in capital cases, while the
other, from Justice Brennan, rejected that scheme in the hope of encouraging
legislatures to provide standards or guidelines to limit jury power.8" Both
Harlan and Brennan, however, used the language of sovereignty and consent
to speak about the jury's role in capital cases, and both recognized the jury,
not the legislature, as the locus of law's death-dealing power.
For Harlan, the comparison between legislature and jury was distinctly
favorable to the latter. In capital cases the final decision, if it was to be
acceptable, had to be based on a highly individualized assessment of a myriad
of factors peculiar to each crime and criminal. 6 This detailed judgment was,
in Harlan's view, precisely the kind that legislative assemblies were incapable
of making. Unbridled jury discretion to choose who shall die from among all
those who commit capital offenses was both just and necessary, given what
Harlan saw as legislative disability. As Harlan stated: "To identify before the
fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which
call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language
which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority,
appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability."87
81. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
82. See Vivian Berger, 'Black Box Decisions' on Life or Death-If They're Arbitrary, Don't Blame
the Jury: A Reply to Judge Patrick Higginbotham, 41 CASE W. Rs. L. REv. 1067, 1067-70 (1991).
83. In Spaziano, the Court rejected a due process claim that the defendants were constitutionally
entitled to have a jury make sentencing determinations in capital cases. However, 30 of the 37 states
authorizing capital punishment at that time left the life or death decision exclusively to the jury.
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 449, 463.
84. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 185.
85. See id. at 199 (Harlan, L, writing for the majority); id. at 249 (Brennan, J., dissenting). These
two responses have been a persistent feature of the Supreme Court's death penalty decisions. For a
critique of the Court's inability to choose definitively between them, see Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639, 657-69 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).




In Harlan's view, words are unable to contain and convey the authorizing
requisites for capital punishment. Language fails in the face of death. As a
result, legal authority must respond to linguistic inadequacy. If legislatures are
unable to speak about the pain and death which the law dispenses, then there
is no choice but to legitimate the de facto discretion of the jury.
But the impossibility of specifying, in advance, standards to determine the
particular criminals who should be executed was, for Harlan, not enough to
justify a sovereign role for the jury. What was needed, in addition, was an
image of how the jury would use its sovereign power. Here, the best Harlan
could do was to engage in a Tocquevillian imagining of the jury ennobled by
the responsibility given to it.88 In this imagining,
jurors confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death
for a fellow human will act with due regard for the consequences of their
decision and will consider a variety of factors .... For a court to attempt
to catalog the appropriate factors in this elusive area could inhibit rather
than expand the scope of consideration .... The infinite variety of cases
and facets to each case would make general standards either meaningless
"boiler-plate" or a statement of the obvious that no jury would need.89
In Brennan's view, there was neither persuasive evidence of legislative
inability to provide structuring guidelines nor reason to assume that unbridled
discretion would not, like all exercises of such unfettered power, produce
arbitrariness and discrimination rather than reason and responsibility. Brennan
countered Harlan's theory of linguistic failure by surveying a variety of means
and mechanisms which legislatures might employ to communicate with the
jury and to guide it in its interpretive task.90 "A legislature," Brennan
argued,
that has determined that the State should kill some but not all of the
persons whom it has convicted of certain crimes must inevitably determine
how the State is to distinguish those who are to be killed from those who
are not. Depending ultimately on the legislature's notion of wise penolo-
gical policy, that distinction may be hard or easy to make. But capital
sentencing is not the only difficult question with which legislatures have
ever been faced.9'
In addition, Brennan rejected Harlan's Tocquevillian optimism regarding
jury sovereignty and substituted a hardheaded type of due process realism.
Brennan believed the power and responsibility that Harlan saw as ennobling
to be fraught with the danger of abuse. As he put it, "[T]he Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment[] is fundamentally inconsisteni with
capital sentencing procedures that are purposely constructed to allow the
maximum possible variation from one case to the next, and provide no
mechanism to prevent that consciously maximized variation from reflecting
88. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 39, at 364.
89. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 208.
90. Id. at 250-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 271 (footnote omitted).
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merely random or arbitrary choice. 92 Brennan suggested that Harlan framed
the issue as a choice between "the rule of law and the power of the States to
kill" and resolved the conflict "in favor of the States' power to kill.
93
Two years after McGautha, this choice was repudiated and undone by the
Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia.94 The Court in Furman
held that the unbridled discretion which Harlan had embraced in McGautha
was, as Brennan suggested it should be, constitutionally unacceptable. 95 Yet,
the Justices in Furman continued to wrestle with the problem of defining the
jury's proper role in capital trials. Like Brennan, Justice Douglas feared that
leaving juries with the untrammeled discretion to decide who should live and
who should die insured "selective and irregular use" of the death penalty and
allowed the punishment of death to be reserved for "minorities whose
numbers are few, who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular, but
whom society is willing to see suffer. '96 Instead of Tocquevillian responsi-
bility, Douglas suggested that jury sovereignty meant that "[p]eople live or
die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12."' 7
Against Douglas' doubt, Chief Justice Burger took up Harlan's defense of
jury sovereignty in capital cases. Burger suggested that "trust in lay jurors...
[is] the keystone of our system of criminal justice"98 and that "as 'the
conscience of the community,' juries are entrusted to determine in individual
cases that the ultimate punishment is warranted." 99 Jurors in capital cases,
facing the awesome decision about whether one of their fellow citizens should
live or die, are, on Burger's account, "meticulous" in their decisions,'0 0 and
"cautious and discriminating [in their] reservation of ... [the death] penalty-
for the most extreme cases."''
The Harlan/Burger advocacy of complete jury sovereignty was finally put
to rest by the Court when, in Gregg v. Georgia,"2 it upheld a Georgia
statute whose purpose was to provide guidance to jurors in selecting those
who should actually receive the death penalty from among the class of
convicted capital murderers. Justice Stewart wrote that jury discretion "on a
matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken
or spared ... must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk
of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.,03 Absent such direction he
92. Id. at 248.
93. Id. at 249. Brennan was prophetic in framing the debate about capital punishment as a debate
about the rule of law itself. For an elaboration of his prophesy, see Justice Marshall's dissent in Payne
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
95. Id.
96. Furman, 408 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 253.
98. Id. at 402 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
99. Id. at 388 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)).
100. Id. For empirical evidence on this point, see Haney et al., supra note 5.
101. Furman, 408 U.S. at 402 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
102. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
103. Id. at 189 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
1117
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
claimed that "juries imposed the death sentence in a way that could only be
called freakish."'
0 4
Justice Stewart, finally completing the work that Brennan began in
McGautha, °5 rejected Harlan's arguments regarding the linguistic impossi-
bility of formulating standards to provide such direction: "While some have
suggested that standards to guide a capital jury's sentencing deliberations are
impossible to formulate, the fact is that such standards have been devel-
oped."' 6 He argued that it was particularly important to provide such
standards for a jury because "members of a jury will have had little, if any,
previous experience in sentencing."' 7 Standards that direct the jury's
attention to the specific circumstances of the crime and of the person who
committed the crime would, in Stewart's view, be sufficient to "'produce non-
discriminatory application"' of the death penalty.
0 8
Yet, despite Stewart's apparent confidence in the efficacy of legislative
standards in insuring the rationality of life and death decisions made by
ordinary citizens, how those decisions are made-how jurors interpret issues
of violence and responsibility that are present in capital trials, as well as how
they understand their own responsibility and the violence they are asked to
authorize-remains a mystery.'0 9 As Justice Powell has written:
Individual jurors bring to their deliberations "qualities of human nature and
varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps
unknowable." The capital sentencing decision requires the individual jurors
to focus their collective judgment on the unique characteristics of a
particular criminal defendant. It is not surprising that such collective
judgments often are difficult to explain."'
III. AUTHORIZING DEATH
In seeking to understand the relationship between law and violence as well
as that between democracy and the death penalty, one wonders how ordinary
citizens, in their role as jurors, could allow themselves-almost inexplicably-
to use their sovereign power to authorize death. This bewilderment arises
because "[t]o any person endowed with the normal inhibitions against the
104. Id. at 206.
105. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 271 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (footnote omitted).
107. Id. at 192.
108. Id. at 198 (footnote omitted) (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974)).
109. "Despite the impressive amount and quality of legal scholarship on capital sentencing, there is
woefully little empirical evidence about how the jury actually goes about its task." Valerie P. Hans,
Death by Jury, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES 149,
150 (Kenneth C. Hans & James A. Inciardi eds., 1988). As Robin West put it in her discussion of recent
death penalty cases dealing with the responsibility ofjurors, "What is missing ... is a robust discussion
of the nature of the responsibility the juror ought to possess, to which the defendant should be
constitutionally entitled: what it means for a juror to engage in morally responsible decisionmaking
." Robin West, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REv. 43, 87 (1990) (emphasis in original).
110. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987) (footnote omitted) (quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407
U.S. 493, 503 (1972)).
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imposition of pain and death, the deed of capital punishment entails a special
measure of reluctance and abhorrence . . . .""' Some insight into both the
nature of that reluctance and how it is overcome is provided by the work of
Robert Cover.
Cover noted that while for most people "evolutionary, psychological,
cultural and moral considerations inhibit the infliction of pain on other people
... in almost all people social cues may overcome or suppress the revulsion
to violence under certain circumstances.""' 2 Providing such cues, Cover
contended, is the peculiar work of law. Cover thus called attention to features
of the "organization of the legal system [itself that] operate[] ... to facilitate
overcoming inhibitions against ... violence.""..3
Two features of that organization have special relevance for understanding
how ordinary citizens become the authorizing agents of law's violence in
capital trials. First, those jurors who authorize violence (i.e., the death
penalty) do not personally carry out the deed which their words authorize. The
juror is asked only to say the words which will activate a process that may
eventually lead to the defendant's death." 4 The juror's act is purely
linguistic. Yet, were jurors required to pull the switch on those whom they
condemn to death, the ability of law to engage their authorizing decisions
would be radically diminished." 5 As Cover put it, "The most elementary
understanding of our social practice of violence ensures that a judge know
that she herself cannot actually pull the switch. This is not a trivial conven-
tion. For it means that someone else will have the duty and opportunity to
pass upon what the judge has done.""' 6 What Cover says about the judge is
surely no less true of jurors.
The second aspect of the legal system which helps jurors overcome their
inhibitions against doing violence is, in fact, suggested by the first: namely
that jury decisions are subject to review on appeal. This means that the judge
or juror who initially authorizes execution is able to transfer responsibility for
his authorizing act, and, in so doing, to deny the very authority of that
act.' For example, Cover noted that "[p]ersons who act within social
organizations that exercise authority act violently without experiencing...
the normal degree of inhibition which regulates the behavior of those who act
autonomously." 
8
The consequences of this ability to transfer responsibility have been well
documented in the jurisprudence of death. They are, in fact, detailed by the
111. Cover, supra note 33, at 1622.
112. Id. at 1613.
113. Id. at 1614.
114. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 28-29.
115. But see MILGRAM, supra note 6.
116. Cover, supra note 33, at 1626.
117. Haney, Sontag, and Costanzo report that "there was a tendency among jurors ... to shift or
abdicate responsibility for the ultimate decision-to 'the law,' to the judge, or to the legal instruc-
tions-rather than to grapple personally with the life and death consequences of the verdicts they were
called upon to render." Haney et al., supra note 5, at 160.
118. Cover, supra note 33, at 1615.
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Supreme Court's opinion in Caldwell v. Mississippi.9 In Caldwell, the
question was whether comments by a prosecutor to the effect that a jury
should not view itself as finally determining whether the defendant should die,
because a death sentence would automatically be reviewed by the state
supreme court, violated the Eighth Amendment. Reviewing those comments
in light of its prior holdings, the Court found it constitutionally impermissible
to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been
led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the
defendant's death rests elsewhere.
120
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in Caldwell, explained:
[T]his Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has taken it as a given that
capital sentencers would view their task as the serious one of determining
whether a specific human being should die at the hands of the State....
Belief in the truth of the assumption that sentencers treat their power to
determine the appropriateness of death as an "awesome responsibility" has
allowed this Court to view sentencer discretion as consistent with-and
indeed as indispensable to-the Eighth Amendment's "need for reliability
in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case."'
121
The question of how juries sentence, in Marshall's view, is therefore central
to the question of whether they may constitutionally exercise the sovereign
power to make life and death decisions.
Marshall then went on to paint a picture of the capital sentencing jury as
made up of individuals placed in a very unfamiliar situation and called on
to make a very difficult and uncomfortable choice. They are confronted
with evidence and argument on the issue of whether another should die,
and they are asked to decide that issue on behalf of the community.
Moreover, they are given only partial guidance as to how their judgment
should be exercised, leaving them with substantial discretion. Given such
a situation, the uncorrected suggestion that the responsibility for any
ultimate determination of death will rest with others presents an intolerable
danger that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its
role. 122
Marshall, echoing the insights of Cover, suggested that anything which
encouraged the sentencing jury to believe that it was not responsible for
authorizing death would encourage the jury to provide such authorization. A
jury thus unburdened might indeed use a death sentence, even when it is
"unconvinced that death is the appropriate punishment," to .'send a message'
of extreme disapproval for the defendant's acts."'
123
From Marshall's opinion in Caldwell, one can glean the suggestion that the
less responsible a jury feels for the actual decision to execute, the more likely
119. 472 U.S. 320 (1985), rev'g in part 443 So. 2d 806 (Miss. 1983).
120. Id. at 341. But see Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) (upholding a death sentence even
though the jury had been told explicitly that it was not ultimately responsible for the sentence it
imposed).
121. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329-30 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)).
122. Id. at 333 (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 331.
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it is to authorize death as a punishment. Yet the mystery of how jurors are
enlisted as agents of state violence remains. This mystery is, as previously
suggested, in one sense an issue of popular sovereignty and in another sense
a problem of understanding the way humans relate to the imposition of pain
and violence on other humans. It is a mystery which can only be explored by
carefully attending to what jurors actually do in, and say about, capital trials.
IV. VIOLENCE, REPRESENTATION, AND RESPONSIBILITY
IN THE CASE OF JOHN HENRY CONNORS
Despite their reassuring, welcoming name, convenience stores are some of
the most dangerous places in America. Late at night these stores provide, as
much as anything else, convenient settings for robbery and murder. This
situation is as true in small towns like Bowling, Georgia,'24 as it is in big
cities throughout the United States. The case of John Henry Connors provides
an apt illustration of that fact.
At 10:30 p.m. on July 23, 1986, John Henry Connors was picked up by two
friends from his modest home on the outskirts of Bowling. Connors, who was
then twenty-six years old, worked in a local auto body shop. He had been
married for seven years but was having serious marital problems. As a result,
he frequently sought the company of his friends to escape his troubled
domestic life. On the night of the twenty-third, Connors and his friends spent
several hours driving around, smoking marijuana, and drinking. Each of the
men had a gun with him.
There was, however, nothing unusual in any of this. It had become a regular
leisure activity for these men to drive along back country roads, get high, and
fire shots into the night until they got bored, sick, or sleepy. And there was
nothing on the night of the twenty-third to suggest that anything would be any
different than it had been before.
Three hours after they initially set out, Connors and his friends stopped at
the local convenience store-The Jiffy Store-to buy one of Jiffy's advertised
"Do-It-Yourself Microwave Meals" and some beer. The two friends went to
the back of the store while John Henry waited for them near the counter
where Andy Donaldson was working as a cashier. After Donaldson finished
ringing up the friends' purchases and opened the cash register to make
change, Connors suddenly pulled out the .357 Magnum pistol that he had
brought with him and shot Donaldson in the chest.
Connors' friends-who would later be granted immunity from prosecution
in return for their testimony against him-were, by their own account, taken
totally by surprise. At the sound of the shot, they ducked and then ran for the
door. In the meantime, Donaldson fell to the floor in a bloody heap, moaning
and writhing in pain while Connors took ten one-dollar bills and some food
stamps from the register. Connors then leaned over the counter and fired a
124. This is a pseudonym. In what follows I have also used a pseudonym for the case described and
for the jurors whose views I discuss. See infra note 126.
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second shot which hit Donaldson above the left eye. After firing the second
shot, Connors joined his friends in their car and escaped into the night.
Eight days later, Connors was arrested after his two friends turned
themselves in to the police. At the time of his arrest, the gun which had been
used to kill Andy Donaldson was found in Connors' home along with the food
stamps and nine of the one-dollar bills he had taken from the Jiffy Store.'25
Connors was charged with, and subsequently convicted of, robbery and malice
murder in the death of Andy Donaldson. He was later sentenced to death.
In what follows, I recount what the jurors in Connors' trial said about that
case, and explore how they arrived at the decision that John Henry Connors
should be sentenced to die.
2 6
A. Imagining Violence
One of the crucial tasks of the prosecution in a capital case is to answer two
questions: who did what to whom, and why the killer deserves to die. To
answer these questions, the prosecutor must portray, in a vivid and compelling
way, the circumstances and nature of the killing.'27 He has to make what is
for most people quite unreal-namely a scene of violent death-real. He has
to put violence and pain into discourse. 28 However, the problems confronted
in putting violence into discourse would seem, at first glance, to be the
opposite of those confronted in representing pain.
Violence is visible and vivid. It speaks loudly, arouses indignation, and as
a result, its representation threatens to overwhelm reason. Therefore, the
problem of representing violence would seem to be one of taming and
disciplining its seemingly unruly representations. Pain, on the other hand, is
125. One of the jurors in the Connors case explained how the police were able to link the money
to the defendant:
In convenience stores they have several different kinds of detection devices that let them know
that they're being robbed, or going to be robbed, or are in the process of being robbed. They
have ... I call it a panic button, a red button. You mash it and all these sirens go off. Some
of them are silent, some of them send a signal directly to the police. In some they have the
cash drawer arranged with ones, fives, tens, and they have a spot for what they call, not fake
money, but mad money. They reach in and may grab this mad money. It is marked so they
know when it is recovered. It's got a little sensor on the bottom and when the mad money is
taken off it that goes off automatically signaling the police.
126. The Connors case is one of thirty Georgia cases which I am examining as part of a national
study of jurors and the death penalty. One objective of the Capital Jury Project study is to understand
how jurors interpret the discourse and representational practices of capital trials and how they come to
be effectively enlisted as agents of law's violence. In each of the Georgia cases, four jurors are
randomly selected and interviewed about the case, with interviews lasting from two to five hours.
127. See Mark Costanzo & Julie Peterson, Attorney Persuasion in the Capital Penalty Phase: A
Content Analysis of Closing Arguments, J. Soc. IssuEs, Summer 1994, at 125, 137.
128. Sarat, supra note 20, at 22-23, 30-38.
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invisible.'29 It defies language and representation, and is, as a result, a
largely silent and unshareable part of our lives.
Yet, violence and its linguistic representation is inseparable from pain and
its representation. One can know the full measure of violence only through the
pain it inflicts; the indignation which people experience in the presence of
violence is, in large part, a function of their imaginings of the pain it inflicts.
In this sense, the problem of putting violence and pain into discourse is one
problem rather than two.
It is the business of law in general and capital trials in particular to make
violence and pain knowable, and to find the means of overcoming their
differing resistances to language and representation. Elaine Scarry suggests
that the courtroom and the discourse of the trial provide one particularly
important site to observe the way in which violence and pain "enter
language."'30 In that discourse, the problem of putting violence and pain into
language is compounded by the fact that
it is not immediately apparent in exactly what way the verbal act of
expressing pain ... helps to eliminate the physical fact of pain. Further-
more, built into the very structure of the case is a dispute about the
correspondence between language and material reality: the accuracy of the
descriptions of suffering given by the plaintiff's lawyer may be contested
by the defendant's lawyer .... For the moment it is enough to simply
notice that, whatever else is true, . . . [a trial] provides a situation that once
again requires that the impediments to expressing pain be overcome. Under
the pressure of this requirement, the lawyer, too, becomes an inventor of
language, one who speaks on behalf of another person.., and attempts to
communicate the reality of that person's physical pain to people who are
not themselves in pain (the jurors).' 3
Scarry invites us to consider the way in which jurors interpret and imagine
the violence and pain they are called upon to judge. She suggests, however,
that in law, as elsewhere, the language which can be invented to facilitate that
imagining is quite limited. 32 "As physical pain is monolithically consistent
in its assault on language, so the verbal strategies for overcoming the assault
129. As Elaine Scarry argues,
Physical pain has no voice .... When one hears about another person's physical pain, the
events happening within the interior of that person's body may seem to have the remote
character of some deep subterranean fact, belonging to an invisible geography that, however
portentous, has no reality because it has not yet manifested itself on the visible surface of the
earth.
... [Pain is v]aguely alarming yet unreal, laden with consequence yet evaporating before the
mind because not available to sensory confirmation, unseeable classes of objects such as
subterranean plates, Seyfert galaxies, and the pains occurring in other people's bodies flicker
before the mind, then disappear... [Pain] achieves its aversiveness in part by bringing about,
even within the radius of several feet, this absolute split between one's sense of one's own
reality and the reality of other persons .... Whatever pain achieves, it achieves in part through
its unsharability, and it ensures this unsharability through its resistance to language.
SCARRY, supra note 56, at 3-4.
130. Id. at 10.
131. Id. (emphasis in original).
132. Id. at 13.
1123
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
are very small in number and reappear consistently as one looks at the words
of patient, physician, Amnesty worker, lawyer, artist."'33 Those verbal
strategies, Scarry suggests, "revolve [first] around the verbal sign of the
weapon."'13 4 Here, one knows violence and pain through its instrumentalities.
Second, one knows them through their effects. Here, violence and pain are
represented in the "wound," that is, the "bodily damage that is pictured as
accompanying the pain."'
35
As the Connors jurors discussed the case, weapons and wounds, instrumen-
talities and effects, loomed large in what were vivid recollections of the scene
of death and the violence that surrounded it. This is the payoff of the
enormous effort that is put into the graphic presentation of the murder, as well
as the actions which led to death and its consequences. Words and photo-
graphs were used in the Connors case, as they are in most other capital trials,
to bring to life the violence outside law. 3 6 It is important to note, however,
that there was no comparable effort made to enable jurors to imagine the
scene of violence and death that they were being asked to authorize. Jurors
were presented with no images of the scene of the prospective execution, of
the violence of electrocution. No such images were admissible or available for
the juror eager to understand what he was being asked to authorize.1 37
In the Connors case, weapons and wounds made the violence which Connors
had visited on Donaldson real and pressing. As Joseph Rane, one of the
jurors, put it:
Connors shot the man-I don't remember the man's name, I can see his
face, I don't remember his name-he shot him. If I'm not mistaken it went
into his chest and came out by his shoulder blade, with a .357 magnum, if
I remember correctly. He leaned over, got some money out of the cash
register. The clerk of the store was laying on the ground, moaning and
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 15. As violence and pain are put into language, one may be tempted to forget that their
metaphorical representation as weapons and wounds cannot truly capture the meaning of violence and
pain themselves. And, in the process of putting those things into language, some types of violence and
pain-those engendered by particular weapons and those which leave visible marks on the body-may
be more easily available. See Sara Cobb, The Domestication of Violence in Mediation: The Social
Construction of Disciplinary Power in Law 20 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Indiana
Law Journal). See generally Kristin Bumiller, Real Violence/Body Fictions (June, 1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (discussing how photographs are used to represent
the injuries done to rape victims). Whereas more diffuse, systemic violence which leaves no visible
marks or scars-the violence of racism, poverty, and despair-will be less easily represented and
understood as violence and pain. "A great deal... is at stake," Scarry herself suggests, "in the attempt
to invent linguistic structures that will reach and accommodate this area of experience normally so
inaccessible to language." SCARRY, supra note 56, at 6.
136. For a comparable analysis in another context, see Bumiller, supra note 135, at 5-17. Luc Sante
argues that photographic evidence of crime scenes is used "to prove that the crime was committed in
the county or municipality where the body was found and the trial scheduled; to give proof of the
corpus delicti ... and its venue; to help establish a motive, by means, for example, of the position of
the body;.., and to clarify the relationship of the body to the weapon and other properties." See Luc
SANTE, EVIDENCE 90 (1992).
137. Recent court decisions have upheld legislative and administrative prohibitions on televising
executions. See Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978);
KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2323 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
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moving around from ... you figure a maximum of three feet with a high-
powered weapon like that. It had knocked him against the back.., he was
on the floor bleeding. And he reached over the counter as he was retrieving
the money and shot him again. It went in, if I'm not mistaken, over his eye
and out behind his ear on the opposite side. 3 '
Like other jurors, Rane was able to speak in a detailed way about the
murder weapon as well as about the entry wounds and exit wounds which it
caused, and about its ballistics and bullet trajectories. When asked if there
was anything specific about the case that stuck out in his mind, Rane, a
twenty-eight-year-old salesman, said,
What I remember is seeing the pictures of the man laying behind the
counter, laying in a puddle of blood probably bigger than this table. And
the pictures-the other jurors and I had to ... it was difficult for some of
them to look at the pictures. They'd take them up so close and they'd show
the clear shots and all. Then we handled the weapon and a lot of them
really didn't want to do that.
Q: Do you still think about those pictures and the gun?
A: Surely.
Another juror in the Connors case, a seventy-three-year-old retired
grandmother, Belle Givens, recalled the violence that Connors had done in
terms of"a big gun. Right that's it. He used a big gun." According to her own
accourit, confronting the instrument of death was a horrifying experience. In
fact, she confronted it unwillingly. She described herself as an unwilling
victim of a process that would not respect her squeamishness in the face of
violence: "Reason I say big gun is because they passed it around and made
me look at it and touch it, and I didn't want to. They made me look at it and
touch it." The image of the violence done by the "big gun" "followed us into
the jury room and it bothered me very much."
For her, like Rane, the image of violence was fixed in the photographic
evidence of the crime scene. Luc Sante argues that
these photographs lack the functions that are usually attached to images of
death. They do not memorialize, or ennoble, or declare triumph, or cry for'
vengeance. As evidence, they are mere affectless records, concerned with
details, as they themselves become details in the wider scope of police
philosophy, which is far less concerned with the value of life than with the
value of order. They are bookkeeping entries, with no transfiguring
mission, and so serve death up raw and unmediated.'39
Belle Givens was a reluctant viewer of death served up "raw and unmedi-
ated"; however, once seen, the image of death was deeply imprinted on her.
But what did this idiot do. As the guy fell down behind the counter he hit
the shelves right in back of him, and John Henry took the gun and leaned
over the counter, put the gun behind the guy's ear-bam-and another shot
killed him. And they showed a picture of the man to the jury. I didn't want
to look. They insisted I had to look. If I don't look, what they decide, well.
138. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text for discussion of the Connors case. Note that
"Joseph Rane" and the names of other jurors are pseudonyms.
139. SANrE, supra note 136, at 60.
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I didn't want not to look and then have to have another trial. So I had to
look, and that's still following me into that deliberating room.
In the system of capital punishment, while the execution is hidden, while
the violence jurors are asked to authorize has no image, and while no one can
claim an entitlement to view an execution, 40 jurors must view the violence
to which they are asked to respond. The law compels the juror to view such
graphic representations and to grasp the death-producing instrumentalities
which are given special evidentiary value in the state's case against the
accused. To refuse to participate in the spectacle of seeing and touching those
representations and instrumentalities is, in essence, to refuse to consider all
the evidence and is, thus, to defy one's oath as a juror. Because the gaze
cannot be legitimately averted, the juror becomes a victim of viewing.
Images and instrumentalities, in their evidentiary guise, engender a vivid
and immediate confrontation with illegal violence and its consequences. They
focus attention by their own particularized focus. As another juror, Charlotte
Howles, explained, "The only thing we saw were pictures they had taken of
the scene and they were just from the head up. You know, of where the
gunshot wounds were at. That's all we saw of him." The victim is presented
only in the violent images of the wounds which ended his life. And no one
has a right to refuse to see those images.
Being forced to confront those images has dramatic consequences in
enlisting jurors to authorize execution. Those images ensure that the victim
will often be remembered as nothing other than the wounds which ended his
life. As Sante says,
If photographs are supposed to freeze time, these crystallize what is already
frozen, the aftermath of violence, like a voice-print of a scream. If
photographs extend life, in memory and imagination, these extend death,
not as a permanent condition the way tombstones do, but as a stage, an
active moment of inactivity. Their subjects are constantly in the process of
moving toward obliteration. 4 '
Kristin Bumiller has argued, referring to similar evidence in a rape trial,
that the principle which insures that the images of violence have such adi
effect is one of "maximum visifiability."' 142 This principle, Bumiller argues,
is applied by using the techniques of close-ups and editing made possible
by staged film production to orient the spectator in the most ideal position
for viewing pleasure. In the courtroom, the prosecutor and expert master
[the] body as technique rather than art; they make use of photographs ...
to stage repetitive viewings of parts of [the] body. This technique fetishizes
the wound.1
43
Indeed, so powerful are those images that Charlotte Howles, when asked if
she could remember what Donaldson looked like, said, "No, because to be
140. See Garrett v. Estelle, 424 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Tex.), rev'd, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978); see also Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2323.
141. SANTE, supra note 136, at 60.
142. Bumiller, supra note 135, at 9.
143. Id.
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honest I didn't look directly at the picture of his face because we were
looking at where the bullets went in and came out. I didn't really look in his
face." Or as Ms. Givens put it,
Normally I consider myself a liberal easterner transplanted here to Georgia
and against capital punishment-always was-but after I saw that picture
of that man, something popped. I saw the pictures of him slumped down
behind the counter and he was shot at somewhere around here and behind
the ear, that was terrible .... I think about it even now and it bothers me
very much.
B. Assigning Responsibility and Explaining Motivation
But the juxtaposition of images of murder made vivid and the virtual
invisibility of law's own violence does not, in itself, explain how jurors read
the discourse and representational practices of capital trials in ways that allow
them to be enlisted as authorizing agents of capital punishment. The testimony
of Connors' jurors suggests that two other factors are crucial. The first of
those factors is the "compulsion" to assign responsibility and explain
motivation.
The origin and force of this "compulsion" in the case of John Henry
Connors can perhaps be appreciated if one first understands that the story of
his killing of Andy Donaldson is a garden variety episode of what Robin West
labels "post-moder murders."'" Such murders, West argues, are
chance encounters between strangers, in which what ... [is] casually
exchanged happens to be death .... The radical disjunction, or discontinu-
ity, between the immeasurably great value of what is being destroyed...
and the minuscule, trivial, "perceived gain" that prompted the murder...
leaves ... a palpable, profound and almost physical need to reestablish
sense and meaning in the universe .... [Such murders] strip the natural
world of its hierarchy of values-life, love, nurture, work, care, play,
sorrow, grief-and they do so for no reason, not even to satisfy the
misguided pseudo-Nietzschean desire of a Loeb or Leopold to effectuate
.precisely that deconstruction. They are meaningless murders.'45
Events like the killing of Andy Donaldson in the context of a ten-dollar
robbery produce an intense effort to restore meaning, to answer the kind of
question put by juror Howles when she asked, "Why? Why did he do it? Why,
for such a small amount of money? I would love to have confronted him,
face-to-face, and asked him why he committed such a senseless thing, it is so
stupid to me to take another human life." Howles' questions express
a simple primal fear that our collective attempt to reassert meaning and
value in a world deconstructed by random violence ... will be ... fleeting
and unsuccessful .... [The juror] is swamped by a physical as well as
psychic need not to succumb, not to be drawn, not to be sucked under, not
to be seduced by the meaninglessness of such murders, into the falsely
144. Robin West, Narrative, Responsibility and Death: A Comment on the Death Penalty Cases from
the 1989 Term, 1 MD. J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 161, 171 (1990).
145. Id. at 170-71 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
1127
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
sophisticated, David Lynch-ian belief in the meaninglessness of the
particular lives ended.'46
The response, West suggests, is a virtually overwhelming desire to "assign
personal responsibility for the murder and its consequences-including the
arrest, trial and its outcome-imposition of the death penalty-squarely and
irrevocably on the defendant."'47
Connors' jurors responded quite as West would have predicted when they
voiced a strong desire to fix personal responsibility on the defendant, to make
him a moral agent capable of being held to account for what otherwise
seemed unaccountable actions. For each of those jurors the capital trial was
a drama in which the question of Connors' agency was at the fore. As Rane
said,
There really wasn't much of a question about Connors' guilt. He was there.
He never denied that. His gun fired the shot; he never denied that. There
was just a lot of talk as if, you know, the fact he was drinking, as if the
bottle left Connors behind, got out of the car, went into the Jiffy, and fired
the shots.
As Howles explained,
They [the defense] said that alcohol had taken hold of his mind at the
moment and that, if he had not been under the influence of alcohol, he
wouldn't have been where he was at. They were blaming it on the alcohol
because that's when they were questioning us as jurors ... that was the
one question they asked us, did we think that alcohol could make you do
things that you normally wouldn't do. It was one of the questions that the
defense asked when they were selecting the jurors.
Another juror, Sylvia Mann, a forty-nine-year-old high school social studies
teacher, rejected the argument that alcohol could provide a sufficient
explanation of why Connors killed Donaldson or that it should somehow
diminish his responsibility:
It did come up that he was under the influence of alcohol and drugs even
though they told us from the beginning that that was not a defense. I felt
that the defense really pushed it a lot. They kept talking about it a lot even
though they said it was not a defense. When we deliberated it was brought
up fairly often that the person was under the influence. But so what? I
mean a lot of people get drunk, but they don't take guns and go shoot up
the Jiffy Store. I don't think anybody really ever felt it was much of a
defense .... He shot someone because he wanted money. Like lots of
people want money but they don't kill other people to get it. And he knew
what he was doing. Because he'd already shot the man and the man was
on the floor and unconscious and there was no need to shoot him a second
time. Apparently he intentionally intended for the man to die.
For this juror, Connors was, despite his alcohol problems, still a moral agent,
fully capable of knowing what he was about-one whose actions suggest an
146. Id. at 171 (emphasis in original).
147. Id.
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inexcusable intention to kill. 148 "Bottles," Mann continued, "don't kill
people. Only people, people like Connors, kill people." By insisting that
Connors was both legally guilty and morally responsible for the murder of
Donaldson, this juror and her colleagues refused to accept the picture of a
social world of events governed by causes beyond human control; instead,
they constructed a moral world of free agents making choices for which they
should be held to account.1
49
As Joseph Rane saw it,
[T]here is a simple explanation for why he [Connors] did it.... He made
a really bad choice. He valued human life for ten dollars. And whether he
was under the influence of alcohol or drugs or whatever, he's still
responsible for what he does and that's something that was brought
out.... He wanted money though if you are familiar with convenience
stores you know that after eleven o'clock they don't even carry twenties in
the drawer. And being under the influence of drugs and alcohol, there's no
telling what it'll make you do. But you still do it. I think he just saw an
opportunity to get some money to go get whatever and he just took that
opportunity.... There was no reason in the world why somebody under
the influence of alcohol or drugs should take anybody else's life. Why
should he be any different from the rest of us? 5'
In these narratives, one sees jurors confronting what Rane himself called
"just one of them whimsical things" and needing to "reassert responsibility
and human agency for a momentous act and momentous deprivation; so that
we can again feel in control of destiny..''.. To his jurors, Connors appeared
to be enough like them that he could justly be subject to their judgment. Yet,
at the same time, he was different enough that his "cold blooded," "vicious"
act could be seen as deserving the most severe, and thus unusual, punishment.
But as the jurors in the Connors case contemplated the question of whether
to authorize such a punishment, another question of responsibility arose: their
own status as agents and their own responsibility as jurors. As West argues:
The juror's responsibility for his fellow citizen, and responsibility to reach
the morally right decision, is precisely what defines the juror as citizen
.... That capacity gives the juror a stake in the affairs of others and
makes him care about the consequences of his decision. The juror's
capacity for doing so, his duty to engage this capacity, and his responsibili-
ty for the outcome are all necessary contributions ... to the vitality of a
liberal, participatory, and non-apathetic society.
152
If Marshall's speculations in Caldwell are correct, the responsible juror, the
juror who sees himself directly and personally responsible for the execution
his decision might authorize would be less likely to lend himself to the project
of law's violence, whereas those who can convince themselves that the
148. See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in HUMAN RIGHTs III (Abraham I. Meldren ed.,
1970).
149. Id.
150. See also West, supra note 144, at 168 (describing the ways in which the law insists on treating
individuals as responsible agents).
151. Id. at 171.
152. West, supra note 109, at 91.
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responsibility lies elsewhere would be more likely to do so. Three jurors in
the Connors case conform to Marshall's expectation; even as they insisted on
Connors' agency, they refused to see themselves in a similar light.
Jurors Mann, Givens, and Rane all talked about their decision to condemn
Connors to death as if that decision were somehow made elsewhere, as if they
were not really making choices or authorizing anything. Each of them echoed
an argument made by Herbert Morris, namely that the person who is truly
responsible for the punishment is the defendant himself."3 In this view the
murderer, by his own acts, actually determines the death sentence. Thus, the
juror who votes for such a punishment is merely the agent of the defendant.
However, the efforts of Mann, Givens, and Rane to avoid responsibility for
their authorizing act of violence did not end there. Each of them was
implicitly aware of a point made by Cover:
[The] social organization of violence manifests itself in the secondary rules
and principles which generally ensure that no single mind and no single
will can generate the violent outcomes that follow from interpretive
commitments. No single individual can render any interpretation operative
as law-as authority for the violent act.'54
This is, of course, readily apparent from the group character of jury decision-
making, but it is also apparent to jurors from the hierarchical nature of the
legal system.
All of the jurors in the Connors case knew, or believed, that their decision
was not the last word.' Each knew or believed that it would be reviewed
by the judge who presided over the trial and/or by an appellate court. All four
thought that the appellate courts were as likely to reject the death penalty
imposed on Connors as they were to accept it, and Mann, Givens, and Rane
all said that the fact that their death sentence would be reviewed by other
actors in the legal process meant that, should Connors actually be executed,
they would not have his death on their consciences. For them, the very
structure of "super due process," '56 and of extended review and appeal,
which had been put in place to assure heightened reliability in capital cases,
made it easier to impose the death penalty.
Only Charlotte Howles saw herself as directly and personally responsible
for the death sentence for which she voted. As she put it:
I was really surprised when I could go in and vote for death because really
and truly, before I was on this jury I had never given it a lot of thought.
And I didn't have any strong convictions one way or the other. It is a big
responsibility, and hard to accept, but I think that's why they have juries
so people like me have to make those hard decisions. I felt from the
beginning that it would be my call, and I thought that if the facts are there
and for certain things I would have no problem going in and finding
somebody guilty and giving them the death penalty. I think that if it's a
153. See Morris, supra note 148, at 111.
154. Cover, supra note 33, at 1628.
155. See Haney et al., supra note 5, at 160 (discussing the tendency of most capital jurors to shift
responsibility for their ultimate decision to the law, the judge, or the jury instructions).
156. See Radin, supra note 36, at 139 (discussing the structure and impact of "super due process").
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heinous thing and if it warrants it, then I would certainly vote again for the
death penalty .... My opinion was that, hey, I'm not going to let this guy
[Connors] out. I would feel the same way if he was guilty, electrocuted
later on, and they found him innocent. I'd feel bad, but not as bad as if I
didn't give him the death penalty and he somehow got out and killed again.
For me, my job was to make sure that that didn't happen again.
The responsibility that Howles felt most acutely was that the death penalty
seemed to be the morally responsible answer to a social crisis engendered by
the kind of random, valueless violence perpetrated by people such as Connors.
In contrast to the meaningless act for which Howles was prepared to hold
Connors responsible, Howles saw the law's violence, and her participation in
the authorization of death itself, as meaningful, purposive, and necessary to
protect innocent others from him.
C. When "Life Doesn 't Mean Life, " "Death Doesn 't Mean
Death," and "'Yes' Means Maybe, but Probably Not"
When people such as Charlotte Howles accept responsibility for imposing
the death penalty, what is the meaning of the penalty they are voting to
impose? When jurors lend their voices and votes to capital punishment, how
do they understand the act that they are authorizing? Here, conversations with
the jurors in the Connors case suggest that substantive inadequacies in the
arsenal of criminal punishment, as well as the processes of review and appeal
that automatically follow a death sentence, combine to push the jurors to
authorize such a sentence. This occurred in the Connors case even though
most jurors were neither deeply enthusiastic about their decision, nor
convinced that Connors would ever be executed.
Those inadequacies and those processes make the violence of the death
penalty seem both a necessary and, at the same time, a highly improbable
event. The former make a death sentence more immediate, while the latter
make execution all the more remote. Those inadequacies and those processes
allowed jurors in the Connors case to decide one thing: that Connors should
be sentenced to death as a way of achieving something else-that he should
spend the rest of his life in jail. While Connors' violent act could not be
denied, the jury's violent gesture would likely be a gesture whose efficacy
would not reside in its being taken literally.
The jurors in the Connors case were overwhelmingly concerned with
incapacitation as a goal of criminal punishment. 157 None of them believed
that executions deterred others, and none embraced a retributivist rationale for
capital punishment. 5 8 Each of them was, however, deeply concerned with
157. For a discussion of the nature and meaning of incapacitation in criminal sentences, see ANDREW
VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
158. Contra Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (holding that the exclusion of jurors who
objected to capital punishment, but who did not state that they would automatically vote against
imposing such punishment regardless of the evidence introduced at trial, violates the accused's right to
an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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the possibility that Connors might someday be back on the streets of Bowling.
Each seemed convinced that Connors' vicious, bloody acts qualified him to
die under the laws of Georgia, yet each believed that what was necessary to
achieve justice was something less than his death at the hands of the state.
Because Georgia law at the time of the Connors trial did not provide for a
sentence of life without parole, 59 each was persuaded that unless he voted
for death, John Henry Connors would soon be out of prison posing a threat
to other innocent people. For these jurors, then, sentencing someone to die
was the only way of insuring that he would live the rest of his life in prison.
As juror Howles explained,
If he had not been found guilty of capital murder he would have gotten
life. But that doesn't mean that he would have served a life term. It means
he would have gotten out in however many years it is you have to serve
before you get out on parole: Isn't it something like seven years? I think
I'm just going by what I hear on TV, you know.
Like the other jurors, Howles embraced death as a punishment as insurance
against the possibility that "if we didn't give him the death penalty, if he did
get back out into society, he would hurt someone else. And I really didn't
want that." .
Jurors Rane and Mann stated that they would have preferred an alternative
to the stark choice between death and a life sentence that did not really mean
life in prison. Both said that they would have preferred to have been able to
vote for a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Both
suggested that they chose death because this alternative (life without parole)
was not available to them.
In fact, Rane reported that a substantial part of the jury's initial delibera-
tions about Connors' fate focused on the meaning of life in prison:
We were concerned that if he got life in prison he would serve only a few
years and then be turned loose. There was one woman who was particularly
adamant that she didn't want that, only problem was she said that she
couldn't vote for death. So that's when the question of life in prison
without the possibility of parole came up and that's when we sent a note
to the judge asking if we could give that. And he called us back out and
had us in the jury box again and he read the question and then told us that
we couldn't, that that was not one of the options given. It would either be
the death penalty or life in prison which means he would have a possibility
of parole.
This turned out to be a decisive moment in the Connors case. As Sylvia
Mann said,
I was truly amazed because many of the people that were on the jury did
not really seem to understand that life does not mean life. And I was
astonished that a good number did not realize that when they started it.
159. For a discussion of the meaning and significance of life without parole, see William H. Wood
III, Note, The Meaning of "Life"for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing,
75 VA. L. REv. 1605 (1989); see also Julian A. Wright, Jr., Note, Life-Without-Parole: An Alternative
to Death or Not Much Life at All?, 43 VAND. L. REv. 529 (1990).
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Those of us who did understand that, it took us to explain it to them
because they really did not understand that. A lot of them would have liked
to have given John Henry Connors life if it had really meant life, you
know, that he was going to go to jail and stay there forever. When the
judge told us it was either life that didn't mean life or death, that changed
things for most of us. But there were still a couple who didn't want
Connors to die .... That meant that we had to talk about the fact that this,
just for the reason that we voted for death, did not necessarily mean that
Connors would die at the hands of the state. And I think we talked a good
bit about the fact that this would go to the Georgia Supreme Court and it
would be reviewed and that if anything was out of the ordinary then it
would be thrown out, and that even after then the man would have many
opportunities to appeal. And I think that probably that discussion helped
more than anything to persuade the two that was reluctant. Just because we
voted death didn't mean he would die.
Life that does not mean life and death that does not mean death: given these
alternatives, jurors in the Connors case struggled to find a way to express
what seems to have been the consensual view that the appropriate response to
the killing of Donaldson would be to put Connors away and to throw away the
proverbial key. Indeed, no one-not Ms. Howles, Ms. Mann, Mr. Givens, or
Mr. Rane-believed that execution was a likely result of a death sentence. As
Howles put it, "We all pretty much knew that when you vote for death you
don't necessarily or even usually get death. Ninety-nine percent of the time
they don't put you to death. You sit on death row and get old."
In Georgia, where capital punishment is concerned, saying "yes" does not
necessarily mean yes. To the jurors in the Connors case, saying yes to the
death penalty meant both more and less than it seemed. It was a way of
expressing their moral horror and revulsion at the violent and "whimsical"
killing of Andy Donaldson and of insuring, as best they were able, that
Connors would himself never be an agent of such violence again.
CONCLUSION
Jurors in capital trials are asked to participate in a set of complex rituals
through which law seeks to gain the right to exercise the ultimate power of
sovereignty: the power over life itself. They are asked to cast the weight of
citizenship on the side of law's violence. It is a remarkable and troubling
aspect of democratic politics that jurors so regularly do so. The Connors case
helps us to understand how and why this happens.
In the Connors case, and in most other capital trials, the representation of
violence is as difficult and uncertain as it is anywhere else. Yet, the
representational practices of capital trials make some kinds of violence vivid
and visible, while effectively hiding others and rendering them invisible.'
60
The violence made visible is the murderous violence of people like John
Henry Connors, whose acts are graphically displayed and the consequences
of which are eagerly implanted in the consciousness of jurors. Great efforts
160. See Sarat, supra note 20, at 21-25.
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are made to persuade jurors that such violence is unnecessary, irrational,
indiscriminant, gruesome, and useless. Law's violence, however, is described
as rational, purposive, and controlled through values, norms, and procedures
external to violence itself. In capital trials, the force of law is represented as
serving common purposes and aims as against the anomic savagery lurking
just beyond law's boundaries.'61
Yet, in all capital trials, the juxtaposition of two different representations
of violence is disquieting, if not destabilizing. This is especially true of the
juxtaposition of the narratives of violence outside law with the linguistic
representation, or nonrepresentation, of law's own violence. In these moments,
putting law's violence into discourse threatens to expose law as essentially
similar to the antisocial violence it is supposed to deter and punish. Benjamin
argues that
in the exercise of violence over life and death more than in any other legal
act, law reaffirms itself. But, in this very violence something rotten in law
is revealed, above all to a finer sensibility, because the latter knows itself
to be infinitely remote from conditions in which fate might imperiously
have shown itself in such a sentence.
162
As a result,
Anglo-American law has traditionally suffered a serious identity crisis over
its awkward relation to violence .... Our system assumes that law is to
hold a monopoly on violence, but this is a monopoly viewed as both
necessary and discomfiting. It is necessary because it is viewed as the
alternative to something worse-unrestrained private vengeance-and it is
discomfiting because those who make and enforce the law would like to
believe that, though they may be required to use force, force is somehow
categorically distinguishable from violence....
... [T]he efforts of modern jurisprudence to finesse or deny the role of
violence have not ceased." 3
These efforts put enormous pressure on events such as the capital trial to
demonstrate and affirm the difference between the violence of law and the
violence that law condemns. The jury's verdict, the spoken truth of the
community as it embraces capital punishment, is the ultimate affirmation of
the meaningfulness of that difference. Thus death sentences, some might
assume, speak for themselves. They convey the authority and the desire that
someone should be put to death by the state. They represent the ultimate
public embrace of law's special brand of violence.
But in the Connors case, while the death sentence did authorize the state to
extinguish the life of John Henry Connors, it is by no means clear that such
a result was, for the jurors who authorized it, the desired result. In this case,
161. As Justice Stewart noted, "The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and
channelling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in
promoting the stability of a society governed by law." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
162. BENJAMIN, supra note 49, at 286.
163. Weisberg, supra note 70, at 175-76.
1134 [Vol. 70:1103
1995] VIOLENCE, REPRESENTATION, AND RESPONSIBILITY
and probably in others, the death sentence was not simply a linguistic
command whose integrity depended on the materialization of punishment on
the body of the condemned. In this case, and in many others, the death
sentence pronounced was, at best, plural, if not indeterminate, in its meanings.
It was at once a powerful condemnation of Connors for his vicious crime, an
expression of frustration at the incompleteness of a sentencing system that did
not provide life without parole, and a way of insuring that Connors would be
imprisoned for life.
Finally, the law, with its elaborate structure of rules, reviews, and appeals
in capital cases, diffuses responsibility for the violence which jurors are asked
to authorize.'" The greater the protections provided for defendants in capital
cases, the greater this diffusion of responsibility will typically be. And, in the
case of the Connors jurors, this greater diffusion of responsibility itself
invited a death verdict.
Law may prize juror sovereignty in death cases, but jurors themselves do
not seem eager to claim their sovereign prerogative. This suggests an
interesting possibility, namely that the greater the protections which are
afforded capital defendants and those convicted of capital crimes, and the
fewer the resulting executions, the more willing jurors may be to lend their
authorizing voice to the death penalty. However, as protections are stripped
away, as they were in the case of Robert Alton Harris and as they have been
in a whole host of recent Supreme Court cases, as law's eager impatience to
get on with the business of turning death sentences into executions is
revealed, and as the frequency of execution increases, law may find itself less
well able to enlist ordinary citizens in the project of authorizing its life-
destroying violence.' 65 In this way, the law's eager appetite to respond to
violence with violence may evoke the disciplining scrupulousness of its
citizen sovereigns.
164. See Cover, supra note 33, at 1628.
165. A similar possibility is suggested by Samuel R. Gross, The Romance of Revenge: Capital
Punishment in the United States, 13 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 71 (1993).
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